We use Swedish ownership data to explore whether a large and diversified shareholder base leads to lower volatility by improving the information content of stock prices. We find that volatility increases in the number of shareholders both with respect to the number of relatively large shareholders and the fraction of shares held by investors with stakes below 0.1%. Volatility is also positively related to the number of institutional owners, though negatively related to the number of under-diversified institutional owners. Foreign investors have no impact. Our results suggest that a large shareholder base does not lower volatility.
There is great variation in the structure of corporate ownership. Whereas some firms have a small number of domestic owners, others have a more diversified structure with institutional investors, private equity, business spheres, and foreign owners as a significant part of the ownership. Some firms have a large fraction of small investors, whereas others are dominated by a smaller number of relatively large ownership blocks. The questions we address in this article are whether stock return volatility is determined by what kind of investors the firm has and how many they are, which is hereafter referred to as the shareholder base. Previous literature has noted the central importance of stock return volatility to financial theory, as well as for practitioners in the investor community (e.g. Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Zu, 2001; Zhang, 2010) . We contribute to this literature by examining shareholder base determinants of volatility.
Our inquiry is motivated by an intriguing conjecture in the literature which holds that volatility decreases in the size of the firm's shareholder base. According to Wang (2007) , the shareholder base-broadening effect occurs because each individual has only partial information about the firm. As the number of investors grows the accuracy of the information available about the stock increases, which in turn lowers the variance of stock returns. This follows from an extension of the Merton (1987) analysis of investor recognition, according to which a small shareholder base leads to higher expected returns because risks are insufficiently shared among investors. While the importance of the shareholder base is hinted at in several papers it has not yet, to our knowledge, been comprehensively investigated empirically (Merton, 1987; West, 1988; Wang, 2007; Rubin and Smith, 2009; Li, Nguyen, Pham, and Wei, 2011) . This study fills this gap.
Stock return volatility may also decrease if the firm diversifies its shareholder base by attracting specific groups of shareholders who are better informed compared to individual domestic investors. The literature has identified two categories of shareholders that are likely to improve the information content of a firm's stock price: institutional and foreign investors. According to Rubin and Smith (2009), institutional investors are more financially sophisticated and therefore contribute to more efficient gathering and processing of information. Using a sample of US firms they find that institutional ownership leads to lower volatility for firms that do not pay a dividend because the information environment tends to be weaker for this category of firms. Li et al (2014) show that trading by foreign investors has a stabilizing influence on volatility in the context of emerging markets following financial liberalisation.
In this study we investigate whether the effects from increasing and diversifying the shareholder base persist in an economy that steers a middle course between the Anglo-American governance model and emerging markets where concentrated ownership is predominant. Sweden has long been a developed, open economy with liquid financial markets that mixes 1) a traditional governance model involving strong controlling owners and various mechanisms for corporate control (e.g. differential voting rights) with 2) a large influx of institutional and foreign owners, whose influence has grown substantially in recent decades. This variation makes for a useful setting for testing the relationship between the size and heterogeneity of the shareholder base, on the one hand, and stock return volatility, on the other.
We furthermore benefit from access to databases on corporate ownership that offer several advantages for identifying the shareholder base. SIS Ägarservice collects detailed ownership data on publicly listed firms in Sweden, and provides the actual ownership lists of these firms. This allows us to characterize firms' shareholder base in terms of the number of investors, their type and nationality, cash flow and voting rights, association with a business sphere, and so on for a broad cross-section of firms, from the very smallest listed firms to the large-cap multinationals.
Furthermore, access to data from the VIRSO files (Visby Research in Stock Ownership) allows us to identify the size of the shareholder base on various dimensions, such as the number of individual, institutional and foreign investors, as well as other categories of owners such as trusts, operating companies, and churches. As will be explained in detail later in this article, several features of these databases are unique, and provide a better identification of the shareholder base than looking at aggregate ownership stakes. We construct a sample of ownership data spanning the years 2000 to 2013, yielding around 1900 firm-year observations. We use a rich set of control variables from theories related to earnings uncertainty, information asymmetry, leverage, and portfolio concentration.
The data does not bear out the hypothesis that a large shareholder base is conducive to lower volatility. In fact, the evidence is overwhelmingly to the contrary. We first show that volatility increases in the total number of shareholders. This effect persists when we break down the shareholder base into different groups based on the relative size of their ownership stakes, which captures differing incentives to produce information about the stock. Volatility increases in the number of relatively large shareholders (stakes>0.1%) as well as in the size of the 'micro-float' (that is, the fraction of shares held by small investors with stakes below 0.1%). These results are generally significant at the 1%-level and robust to various econometric approaches. We implement an instrumental-variable approach (2SLS) to deal with the potential problem that small investors selfselect into high volatility stocks, which could also explain the association. The relationship remains statistically significant after we account for selection.
The evidence also fails to support the hypothesis that a more diversified ownership structure leads to lower volatility. Taken together, the evidence instead suggests that having a large number of institutional investors causes volatility to increase, whereas the number of foreign investors has no effect. There is a robust and highly significant relation between the number of institutional owners and volatility, consistent with previous research showing a positive relationship using US data (e.g. Campbell et al, 2001; Xu and Malkiel, 2003; Dennis and Strickland, 2009 ). The effect of institutional trading on volatility remains an unresolved issue, however, and our study complements previous studies because we use the number of institutions rather than the aggregate ownership stake. We argue that a count measure better captures the preconditions for the trading and herdingbehavior that has been ascribed to institutional investors (Sias, 2004) . A high degree of institutional ownership, on the other hand, could be explained by the presence of a limited number of large block holdings. If such block holdings are also more long-term in nature, as seems likely, such a measure will be a relatively poor proxy for institutional trading.
We interpret our findings to suggest a trading channel-explanation. Zhang (2010) argues that sources of stock return volatility can be divided into either fundamental factors related to uncertainty about future dividends, or factors related to trading patterns. We find, using a simultaneous equations-approach (3SLS), that various proxies for the size of the shareholder base are indeed positively related to trading volume (significant at the 1%-level), and that the effect on volatility from the shareholder base is accounted for by this channel. A plausible interpretation is that the size of the shareholder base, in particular the micro-float, captures the presence of noise trading.
1 Noise traders are affected by beliefs and sentiments that are not fully justified by fundamental news (Shleifer and Summers, 1990) . Such traders do not, unlike so-called arbitrageurs, form rational expectations about future returns given the available information. While the presence of noise traders increases the value of information to rational investors, creating incentives to produce more information, prices do not necessarily become more efficient. An important reason for this is related to practical limits to arbitrage (Black, 1986; Shleifer and Summers, 1990) . Our data instead supports the view that the traits typically attributed to noise traders (such as over-reaction to news and trend-following) instead serve to amplify stock return volatility. This interpretation is consistent with studies investigating the trading patterns of individual retail traders (e.g. Foucault,
Sraer, and Thesmar, 2011).
We also contribute to a recent strand in the literature that seeks to explore heterogeneity among investors for explaining the relationship between institutional ownership and volatility (Rubin and Smith, 2009; Chichernea, Petkevich, and Zykaj, 2015; Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi, 2014) . show that it is predominantly investors with a short investment horizon (high churn-rate) who are responsible for the positive association between institutional ownership and volatility. We find that it matters whether institutional investors have large or small ownership stakes. Whereas a high overall number increases volatility, the relation between the number of large institutional ownership stakes and volatility tends to be negative. It follows that the positive relation reported initially is driven by the presence of a high number of relatively small institutional investors.
We believe this is consistent with a story about investment horizons: large institutional holdings are more likely to be long-term investments and have a dampening effect on volatility, whereas having many small institutional investors is conducive to more trading. We also show that the reduction in volatility is even stronger when the largest institutional investors are over-exposed to the firm in question, using measures of portfolio concentration similar to those used in Ekholm and Maury (2014) . We address concerns about endogeneity by showing that the effect of having a large number of institutional investors on volatility is in fact lower for high values of the firm's microfloat, which captures the presence of a multitude of small and uninformed traders. This speaks against the notion that institutional investors, in order to profit from their superior information, select into highvolatility stocks with a larger number of noise traders.
We conclude that a large and diverse shareholder base leads to a more volatile stock price.
This may seem puzzling in light of well-documented attempts by corporate managers to boost the firm's shareholder base and the liquidity of its stock. The strand of research dealing with the "neglected stocks-hypothesis" has generally found a positive value-effect from boosting the visibility of the stock, which often includes measures aimed at increasing the size of the shareholder base (see Chichernea, Ferguson, and Kassa, 2015 , for a summary of this literature). According to Merton's (1987) equilibrium model, neglected stocks (that is, those with a small shareholder base) are priced below their full information equilibrium price when investors follow only a subset of firms and are insufficiently diversified. Our findings should be viewed against the backdrop of Merton's intuition and the subsequent literature on neglected stocks. An increase in volatility resulting from a larger fraction of noise trading may be a price worth paying to avoid the detrimental value effects from being stuck in a neglected corner of the market.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I reviews prior literature and presents the hypotheses to be tested in this article. Section II introduces the sample, variables, and empirical methodology. Section III contains the empirical analysis of the determinants of stock return volatility. Section IV concludes the paper.
I. Prior literature and hypotheses

A. The shareholder base and stock return volatility
According to Merton (1987) there is a relation between investor recognition (the shareholder base) and expected returns. A small shareholder base implies that only a fraction of the stock market is informed about the stock. This increases expected returns since risky assets are valued below their full information equilibrium price when there is insufficient sharing of risks.
Extending on Merton's analysis, Wang (2007) demonstrates that increasing the size of the shareholder base reduces volatility. Wang argues that volatility decreases because the accuracy of the price signal improves, i.e. the degree to which the stock price reflects underlying fundamentals.
On an intuitive level, when more information is reflected in the stock price, fewer events will count as news requiring a reassessment of the price. When the collection and processing of information is efficient events are, to a larger extent, anticipated by the market.
A higher information content of the stock price can come about in different ways. According to Holmström and Tirole (1993) increases in the shareholder base (liquidity trading in their model)
increases the marginal value of information production for speculators. The resulting flow of information into the market increases the amount of information that is reflected in the stock price.
Rubin and Smith (2009) make a similar argument for institutional investors. According to their institutional sophistication-hypothesis, institutional investors, by way of their higher financial sophistication, improve the information content of market prices which in turn lowers the volatility of stock returns.
The above outlined arguments suggest that a larger and more diversified shareholder base is associated with lower volatility. We will refer to this as the shareholder base-hypothesis of stock return volatility.
B. Other theories of stock return volatility
This section takes its point of departure in the two broad theories of stock return volatility referred to by Zhang (2010) as "fundamentals" and "the trading channel". The trading channel refers to the empirically observed connection between trading volume and volatility. A higher trading volume implies a higher level of volatility, reflecting that prices tend to move when trades occur. Whereas ownership per se does not affect volatility, the trading behavior of different categories of owners is likely to do so. For example, institutional investors as a group have been associated with herding behavior (Sias, 2004) .
In the terminology of Zhang (2010) "fundamentals" refer to variables that impact uncertainty about future free cash flows. The literature has investigated several proxies that capture the extent of uncertainty about future free cash flows, henceforth referred to as earnings uncertainty.
2 These include the cross-sectional variation in earnings (Pástor and Veronesi, 2003; Wei and Zhang, 2006) ; growth options (Cao, Simin, and Zhao, 2008) ; technology intensity (Schwert, 2002) ; and firm focus (Dennis and Strickland, 2009) . Taken together, the findings in these studies support the notion that fundamental uncertainty is positively related to stock return volatility.
Uncertainty about fundamentals may be exacerbated by lack of information about the firm.
When information asymmetries are high investors have more difficulty predicting future states, leading to larger and more frequent revisions and hence higher volatility. The firm's information environment is likely to be impacted by factors such as the firm's age (Pástor and Veronesi, 2003) ; the disclosure requirements of the exchange on which it is listed (ibid); size (Singhvi and Desai, 1971) ; and dividends (Baskin, 1989 ).
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Volatility is furthermore determined by leverage. The volatility of equity returns will be amplified by leverage because the firm's equity is a levered position in the firm's assets (Black, 1976) . Previous papers have documented an association between financial leverage and stock return volatility (e.g. Dennis and Strickland, 2009; Rubin and Smith, 2009 ).
Ownership matters also because different owners have different preferences for corporate governance (Li et al, 2011) and risk-taking (Faccio, Marchica, and Mura, 2011) . It is reasonable to expect that a preference for low-risk policies is systematically related to the degree of diversification on part of the largest owners, or what Ekholm and Maury (2014) have labelled 'portfolio concentration'. According to this argument, then, the more of an investor's wealth that is concentrated to a given firm, the larger are her incentives to monitor managers and limit risk-taking in this firm. We will refer to this as the portfolio concentration-hypothesis of stock return volatility.
II. Sample, model specification, and variables
A. Sample and data
The sample used in this study is the intersection of three databases: SIS Ägarservice (ownership data), the VIRSO files (shareholder base data) and Datastream (financial data). The sample covers the period between 2000 and 2013. Merging these databases yields around 1900 firm-year observations. The industry composition is as follows: basic materials 6%; industrials 32%; consumer goods 11%; health care 13%; consumer services 13%; telecommunications 2%; technology 13%; and oil & gas 3%; financials 7%. There are no utility firms in the sample. Our data covers the main exchange in Sweden (Nasdaq OMX, which in turn consists of the Large-cap, Mid-cap, and Small-cap lists). In addition, it covers firm listed on the Nordic Growth Market (NGM). Firms listed on the two exchanges for risk capital, First North and Aktietorget, are not included. Our sample represents more than 99% of the total market capitalization of Swedish listed firms.
We obtain the data on the shareholder base from the VIRSO files. 4 These files draw on raw data from Euroclear Sweden (formerly VPC). The advantages of using data based on Euroclear Sweden are stated in Bodnaruk and Österberg (2009) . Euroclear Sweden bases its calculation of the number of shareholders on an electronic register in which all outstanding shares, and their owner, are automatically recorded. The Compustat estimate of the number of shareholders of record, however, is based on information in 10-K filings, where firms are required to approximate the number of holders of each class of common equity. Furthermore, the Compustat data does not identify individuals holding stock through a brokerage house, employee stock option plan, or trust.
As a result, multiple individuals will appear as a single shareholder of record when they own their stock through the same intermediary. The data from Euroclear Sweden does not have this bias.
The VIRSO files furthermore match the raw information on security ownership in Euroclear
Sweden with various official registers to identify the nature of the owner. Each share is connected to an individual or legal entity through a Social Security number or organization number (which is required to register a company with the Swedish Companies Registration Office, "Bolagsverket").
The organizational number will differ depending on whether the unit is an operating company; nonprofit association; church; foundation; and so on. Alternatively, the basis for identification of legal entities is the classification used by Statistics Sweden (SCB, the official administrative agency of statistics in Sweden). In addition, the VIRSO files identifies mutual funds through a particular register of firms that are under the supervision of Finansinspektionen, the authority entrusted with the task of monitoring financial firms and the stability of the financial system in Sweden.
We also utilize ownership data collected by SIS Ägarservice, a Stockholm-based firm specialized in providing and analyzing ownership information. They provide ownership lists for public firms in Sweden that show the number of A, B and preference shares held by a particular individual or legal entity; the associated cash flow and voting rights; the owner's nationality; a flag indicating whether the owner is classified as an insider
5
; and the 'weight quota'. The weight quota is defined by SIS Ägarservice as the focal firm's share of the owner's Swedish portfolio less the firm's share of the 5 This classification is based on Finansinspektionen, the central authority for overseeing financial markets in Sweden. A person is considered an insider if he or she can be regarded to have a relationship with the company such that it is likely to provide inside information about its affairs. Typically, but not limited to, this would be an executive officer, director of the board, or an owner with more than 10% of the votes.
total Swedish stock index. A positive weight is interpreted as the owner being over-exposed in this firm relative to the exposure one would obtain from investing in a broad index. A negative weight is correspondingly interpreted as being under-exposed to the firm in comparison with the index. A value of zero means that the owner has an exposure to the focal firm that is equal to that obtained from investing in the index. Typically an ownership list identifies the 50-200 largest shareholders.
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Ownership stakes smaller than 0.1% are not published for integrity reasons. They are rather summed up in a residual figure, which we refer to as 'the micro-float'.
Another powerful feature of SIS Ägarservice is that they allow the user to view the ownership list organized according to spheres of influence. Activating this option means that individual owners who can be assumed to act in a synchronized way, based on e.g. kinship, are listed as a group. This reveals where the control of the firm ultimately lies ('ultimate ownership'). As an example consider the ownership of Clas Ohlson, a large-cap retailer, at year-end 2013. The raw ownership list would suggest that control lies with the single largest owner (at 17.3% of votes).
However, the sphere-view reveals that the members of the Haid-family (none of whom was the single largest owner) together controlled 37% of the votes and had ultimate control.
SIS Ägarservice also traces out and provides detailed information on the holdings of the 20 most influential spheres in Sweden. These spheres are typically built around the holdings of successful industrialists. One example is the Kinnevik-sphere, which originated in the various business ventures of the entrepreneur Jan Stenbeck. A salient feature about several of these spheres is that they use a complex web of controlling stakes and cross-holdings to achieve effective control, though cash flow rights are typically much smaller than control rights (see Collin, 1998) . 
B. Empirical approach
Our main empirical model is a straightforward OLS estimation of the determinants of volatility with unbalanced panel data. As a complement we also estimate a dynamic panel data model that includes lagged volatility as an explanatory variable.
7 Also the dynamic model is estimated with OLS since GMM methods such as Arellano and Bond (1991) 
where α k is industry fixed effects, f l is listing fixed effects, d t is period fixed effects, and v j,t is an error term. Earnings uncertainty j,t-1 , information asymmetry j,t-1 , leverage j,t-1 , portfolio concentration j,t-1 , and shareholder base ,t-1 are arrays of variables related to the five theoretical dimensions reviewed in 7 It is important to note that excluding an autoregressive term from a regression (a regular time series regression or as in our case a static panel data regression) is not an omitted variables problem. For the nonpanel case most standard textbooks in statistics point out that autocorrelation in the residuals still leaves OLS estimates unbiased and consistent (but inferences will be incorrect). The reader is referred to Greene for details (2002, p.265) . This also holds true for static panel data models (Baltagi, 2008, p.92) . Excluding the AR(1) term leaves residuals autocorrelated within firms (over time), but correct inference is still obtained by clustering standard errors at the firm level (which we do in all specifications). Another potential disadvantage with a dynamic specification is that when the dynamic structure is incorrectly specified, coefficient estimates will be biased (Lee, 2012). When T is small, as in our case, correctly specifying the dynamics is difficult. However, we report the results including an auto-lag since doing so is common in the empirical literature on volatility.
section I.B. The subscript t indexes time, k industries, l stock exchange listings and j indexes firms.
Based on recommendations in Petersen (2009) we use standard errors clustered at the firm level.
Since the model always includes period fixed effects we need only to account for clustering of standard errors within firms (over time). In all estimations we lag the independent variables one period since volatility is estimated based on daily returns during the year, whereas the independents are measured at year-end.
It is important to note that the analysis in Merton (1987) C. Variables
Volatility
We construct our measure of volatility by using the theory of realized volatility originally proposed in Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) . They show that the true unobservable volatility can be very well approximated by using squared return data of a higher frequency than the variance being constructed. In practice market microstructure noise means that the sample frequency cannot be arbitrarily high since this introduces bias (see for example Aït-Sahalia, Mykland, and Zhang, 2005, as well as Hansen and Lunde, 2006) . In practice 5 min to 15 min returns are often used to construct daily volatility, and yearly volatility is often constructed from daily data. We compute volatility by first squaring daily stock returns and summing the squared terms over all trading days in the year.
Our estimate of the annualized total volatility, Volatility, is defined as the square root of this sum.
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As an alternative measure we also calculate idiosyncratic volatility by applying the same procedure to the standard errors from an estimation of the market model in which daily stock returns are regressed on the Swedish market index. Similar to other authors in the literature we find that the correlation is very high (0.98) and it does not matter to our results which of the volatility measures we use. We prefer to use total volatility because it also captures the extent to which our independent variables have a systematic component. We do not pursue other approaches to calculate idiosyncratic volatility, such as deriving it from an estimate of the Fama and French 3-factor model (FF3, Fama and French, 1993) . The factors in FF3 are instead included as independent variables in our regressions.
Shareholder base
To measure the overall size of the shareholder base we use the number of common shareholders of record, Nrshareholders, as obtained from the VIRSO files. This variable corresponds to the 9 To make sure our daily returns are not contaminated by market microstructure noise we calculate so-called volatility signature plots for daily, bi-daily and weekly returns. Market microstructure noise will bias the estimate if the frequency is too high but, reassuringly, we find the same level of volatility for all three sample frequencies.
shareholder base measure used in Bodnaruk and Östberg (2009 for speculators, which increases the total information production. On the other hand, relatively large investors (in our case, those that have stakes larger than 0.1%) have stronger economic incentives to collect and process information about the stock. While the mechanism is different, both arguments imply that volatility should be a decreasing function of the number.
To measure the diversity of the shareholder base we look at institutional and foreign ownership. 11 We employ several measures of institutional ownership. We first calculate the number of institutional owners, Nrinst. This is obtained from the VIRSO files. We sum the number of mutual funds (including hedge funds), insurance companies, and trust funds. 12 We obtain the variable
Nrinstdef by deflating it with the total number of shareholders. To create a measure similar to the one used by previous studies on stock return volatility we use Instown, defined as the sum of ownership stakes held by institutional investors. It is limited to the 15 largest owners of the firm.
Typically the 15 th largest ownership stake is below 1% and summing stakes below this size has a negligible impact on the aggregate number.
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Nrforeign is defined as the number of investors not domiciled in Sweden. A caveat is that, with few exceptions, this variable comprises only legal entities, since the names and personal numbers of non-Swedish individuals are not available in the raw data from Euroclear Sweden.
Another caveat is that there is no distinction between foreign institutional owners and other kinds of entities such as operating companies. Nrforeigndef deflates this variable with the total number of shareholders. Foreignown is the sum of ownership stakes held by institutional investors. Similar to
Instown it is limited to the stakes held by 15 largest owners of the firm.
Other variables
12 Pension funds are included mainly in the insurance companies' category, but some are also recorded among trust funds.
13 This limitation is imposed also because these owners had to be classified manually by the authors since they are obtained from SIS Ägardata, which does not indicate the owner's status as an institution.
Our proxies for portfolio concentration focus on the firm's largest owner, as they have both the means and incentives to influence corporate policy. Table I reports the descriptive statistics for the variables introduced in section II.C. All financial ratios are winsorized at the 97.5 and 2.5 th percentiles to mitigate concerns about the impact of outliers.
III. Empirical analysis
A. Descriptive statistics
Microfloat exhibits useful variation, ranging from a maximum of 92% of all outstanding shares to below 1%. On average, 29.4% of a firm's total outstanding shares consists of very small stakes (<0.1%). It can also be seen that the variable Weight has much smaller negative values than positive ones. This is no surprise because it targets the largest owner in the firm, who are very rarely underexposed to the firm in question (in comparison with the market index). Table II Table III reports the average yearly cross-sectional Pearson correlations between a subset of variables used in this study. Volatility exhibits clear tendency to co-vary with several of the independent variables with the sign of the correlation largely consistent with the empirical predictions. Size (-), dividend (-), and earnings (-) stand out as highly correlated with volatility.
Nrinstdef and Instown exhibit a negative correlation with volatility, though this is quite possibly due to a positive association with size. Several of the independents are correlated but generally the coefficient does not exceed 0.6, which suggests that multicollinearity is not a problem in this sample.
[INSERT [
INSERT TABLE IV ABOUT HERE]
In Model 1 we note that volatility increases in the number of investors (Nrshareholders). Similarly, the relation between Microfloat and Nrshlarge, on the one hand, and volatility on the other, is positive (Model 2). All measures of the shareholder base are highly significant. We interpret these results as evidence against the conjecture that a large shareholder base has a dampening effect on volatility. We return in sections III.C and III.E to a more detailed discussion of these findings.
Model 3 provides evidence that a larger number of institutional owners is associated with higher volatility (significant at the 5%-level). 15 These results are in line with previous studies which, using US data, generally find a positive relation (Campbell et al, 2001; Xu and Malkiel, 2003; Dennis and Strickland, 2009 ). However, it is worth noting that the variable typically used in the literature is the sum of institutional ownership stakes, 16 whereas we use a count measure that basically weighs each institution equally. We argue that a count measure better approximates institutional trading because a measure based on ownership stakes might be unduly affected by the inclusion of one or more large block holdings. While one should be careful not equate the size of ownership stake with trading frequency, it is quite plausible that the larger the stake, the more strategic and long-term is also the investment. With our measure, on the other hand, a high value signals the presence of a multitude of relatively small institutional holdings, which are likely to be more prone to trade and exhibit the herding behavior that previous literature has ascribed them (Sias, 2004 ). When we use
Instown, which is similar to the institutional ownership-variable used in the literature, we find no significant relation. We return in section III.F to the distinction between small and large institutional holdings.
Model 4 shows that the statistical significance of the shareholder base-proxies continue to hold if lagged volatility is included in the model.
In Table IV many of the independent variables are highly significant. Most signs are consistent with expectations. For example, large firms; firms that pay dividends; have low leverage; are well diversified; have a high bid-ask spread; and have a high earnings realizations are associated 15 The large coefficient is a result of the fact that we deflate with the total number of shareholders, which is a much greater number. In untabulated regressions, we use the log of Nrinst as an alternative. The relation is again positive and significant (this time at the 1% level).
with lower volatility. Interestingly, both forms of corporate diversification (geographical and product segments) are negatively related to volatility. On the whole, variables associated with fundamental uncertainty and information asymmetries do well in terms of explaining volatility, whereas proxies for portfolio concentration (Weight and Sphere) do poorly. The listing dummies are generally significant with the expected signs. Notably the NGM listing has a large positive coefficient, indicating significant excess volatility for stocks traded on this list. We also note that the model explains variation in volatility well as indicated by the adjusted R 2 of 52%, which compares favorably with previous studies.
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One result deserves a brief elaboration. The coefficient on Booktomarket is positive, indicating that firms with more growth options have lower volatility. 18 This is at odds with the finding reported in Cao et al (2008) , who report that growth indicators are positively related to idiosyncratic risk. We attribute this difference to the empirical design rather than using different samples. (2014) report values between 22 and 37%. 18 We can appreciate the economic intuition behind the positive sign on Booktomarket by recognizing another common interpretation of this variable in the literature, namely that it proxies for firm value, similar to how Tobin's Q is applied in many studies. Viewed this way, a low value for Booktomarket can be read as signaling a higher-valued firm with a successful and proven business model. Our result is then suggesting that this "business success" has a stabilizing effect that dominates the higher uncertainty from having a relatively larger share of value coming from future growth options.
As discussed previously, to account for time-variability in stock market participation we also estimate Fama-McBeth regressions with Newey-West corrections. The results are reported in Table   V . As can be seen, our main conclusions are unaffected by the change in estimation method. Both Nrshlarge and Microfloat remain significant (at the 1 and 5%-levels, respectively), as does Nrinstdef (5% significance). Also when we use this econometric framework, Nrforeigndef fails to achieve significance at conventional levels. The similarity in results can be understood by the results in 
C. Endogeneity
Self-selection presents us with an endogeneity-concern regarding the interpretation of the relation between the number of investors and volatility. It is possible, for example, that small shareholders self-select into high-volatility shares if they are prevented from using leverage because of financial constraints and therefore seek higher-risk assets (Frazzini and Pedersen, 2014) . 19 To address this issue we use the number of shares (Nrshares) as instrument in a 2SLS-approach. This variable has a strong positive correlation with Microfloat, and there is no a priori reason why the number of shares 19 A similar self-selection could occur if smaller investors are simply more risk-seeking. There is, to our knowledge, little in the literature to suggest such a monotonic relationship between the size of the ownership stake and risk-seeking behaviour. Risk aversion is typically assumed to be a function of wealth and other state variables, or psychological factors such as whether the investor operates in the domain of losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) .
should be linked to volatility. In our first stage regression we regress Microfloat on the same independent variables as reported in Table IV plus the log of Nrshares. As expected, Nrshares is highly significant (p-value=0.001) with a positive sign in the first stage. In the second stage, we use the predicted values from this regression as our instrument. The coefficient remains significant at the 1% level. Compared to the baseline results in Table IV the effect on volatility is now stronger, suggesting that the causal effect is higher than indicated by the initially estimated coefficient.
The relationship between the number of institutional owners and volatility may also reflect selection into high-volatility stocks. Yan and Zhang (2009) argue that better informed institutions prefer stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility because it allows them to take advantage of mispricing. To investigate this issue we use Microfloat, which we consider a direct measure of the importance of small and less informed investors in the shareholder base. We interact Nrinstdef and
Microfloat (results are not tabulated but available from the authors). We expect institutions to have a bigger impact when the microfloat is large, because this would indicate more mispricing due to noise trading. Fig. 1 shows how the effect of Nrinstdef on volatility changes for different values of
Microfloat. It suggests that the relation between Nrinstdef and volatility is weaker for high values of
Microfloat, which contradicts the selection-story.
[INSERT FIG. 1 ABOUT HERE]
D. Survivorship bias
An important aspect of our sample is that it contains data only for firms that are listed as per December 31, 2013. Firms that have been listed in the sample period but for some reason have made an exit prior to this date are not included. A potential critique against our analysis in section III.B is therefore that it suffers from survivorship bias. It is not an unreasonable assumption that those firms that make an exit are fundamentally more risky (and therefore more volatile). For example, a firm may delist because it defaults on its debt and becomes bankrupt. To mitigate concerns about survivorship bias, we carry out two additional regressions in which we change the starting year. The results are reported in Table VI . For ease of comparison, Model 1 contains the result from the estimation using the full sample (and is thus identical with Model 3 in Table IV ). In
Model 2 the starting year is changed from 2000 to 2005, and in Model 3 it is set to 2010. The more recent the starting year, the more balanced and representative the sample becomes since new and presumably more risky firms enter the sample as we move along towards 2013. According to Table   VI , the results with regard to the ownership variables are robust to narrowing in the starting year of the estimation, so survivorship bias appears not to be a major threat to the validity of our results.
The impact of Microfloat gets larger as the time period is narrowed, suggesting that including more of the smaller and more risky firms increases the importance of this variable.
[INSERT TABLE VI ABOUT HERE]
E. The trading channel explanation
The results in section III.B do not support the hypothesis that a large shareholder base leads to lower volatility. In fact, we find the opposite. A natural way to explain such a result is to argue that a large shareholder base is conducive to more trading, which previous literature has shown to be positively related to volatility (e.g. Rubin and Smith, 2009) . Our interest at this point is to see to which extent our proxies for the shareholder base explain trading volume. Any such effect would point in the direction of a trading channel explanation. We also wish to understand if the original relationship between the shareholder base and volatility is accounted for by this effect on volume. These are testable propositions, for which purpose we collect data on annual trading volumes (Datastream code: VO).
To investigate the trading channel explanation, Table VII [
INSERT TABLE VII ABOUT HERE]
The results in Table VII support the trading channel-explanation. We find that Microfloat and Nrshlarge are positively related to trading volumes, and both are significant at the 1%-level. What is more, when we reintroduce the shareholder base variables in the volatility-equation none of them maintains the significance they had in the baseline regressions. 21 That is, when we model volatility and volume simultaneously, the shareholder base variables lose their ability to explain volatility, suggesting there is no direct effect. We conclude that the effect the shareholder base has on volatility operates through the trading channel (as captured by trading volume).
F. Institutional ownership -a closer look
According to the results in section III.B, having a large number of institutional owners leads to lower volatility. A recent development in the literature has been to explore heterogeneity among institutional investors. argue that ignoring institutional heterogeneity can produce confounding results because institutions exhibit differences in trading behavior, which in turn is caused by differences in objectives, limits, and other characteristics of each institution. They show that it is predominantly investors with a short investment horizon that brings about the link between institutional investors and volatility since they have a higher trading intensity.
We contribute to the literature on institutional heterogeneity by looking at how large institutional ownership stakes differ from their smaller counterparts. Moreover, we add a measure that takes into account the degree to which the largest institutions are over-exposed to the company in question. Our results, reported below, support the argument in that heterogeneity among institutions are important for understanding stock return volatility.
First, we split institutions into two groups, one containing only the number of large institutional owners, here defined as the number of institutions among the firm's 15 largest shareholders, Nrinstlarge. The other group, as represented by Nrinst, now captures the number of small stakes held by institutional owners. Since Nrinstlarge has a very low median number we use the log of these variables in this analysis rather than deflating with the total number of shareholders.
We argue that large ownership stakes are more likely to be strategic and long-term investments, thus capturing reduced trading, similar to institutions with a low churn rate (Yan and Zhang, 2009; . Model 1 in Table VIII yields results consistent with this argument. Whereas
Nrinst, as before, enters the models with a positive sign, the coefficient on Nrinstlarge is negative.
Having many institutions among the largest owners therefore has a dampening effect on volatility.
This, we believe, is consistent with the institutional preference hypothesis in Rubin and Smith (2009), according to which institutions are restricted by various rules and constraints that make them prefer "prudent stocks", i.e. low volatility.
Large institutional owners may have an even stronger preference for low-volatility stocks if the equity investment represents a large portion of their portfolio of equities (that is, a high portfolio concentration). According to Ekholm and Maury (2014) investors that have a high portfolio concentration (that is, are under-diversified) have stronger incentives to collect information and monitor the firm. Therefore, if the institution is over-exposed to the stock in question we expect volatility to be reduced even further. We construct a measure labeled Instconc that weighs each institutional investor's portfolio concentration (our variable Weight) with the size of the institutional ownership stake. In this case we focus on the three largest investors. To understand the computation, let us say that the first and second largest investors of the firm are institutions and the third is an individual. The institutions hold 15% and 8% of outstanding stocks, and have portfolio concentrations of 0.5 and 0.25, respectively, indicating over-exposure to the stock. Then our measure would be calculated as: 0.5*15%+0.25*8%+0= 0.1, which indicates that, considered as a group, the largest institutional investors are over-exposed to the firm. Model 2 in Table VIII 
IV. Conclusions
A major conclusion of this study is that the shareholder base is important for understanding crosssectional variation in stock return volatility. The main focus has been investigating an intriguing but so far under-researched conjecture which holds that volatility decreases in the size and diversity of the firm's shareholder base because these factors improve the information content of the stock price. We show that various proxies for the size and diversity of the shareholder base in fact increase volatility, contradicting the conjecture. This conclusion is robust to changes in the econometric approach, and holds after taking self-selection into account.
The data strongly supports a trading channel explanation for these findings. We are able to verify that proxies for the size of the shareholder base are positively related to trading volume, and that its effect on volatility goes through this channel. We have therefore identified some of the factors that appear to underlie the association between volume and volatility reported in the literature. We have proposed that the association between having a large shareholder base and high volatility may be indicative of the presence of noise trading. Such trading is often linked to behavioral biases like trend-following and over-confidence. However, we caution against interpreting this evidence as saying that a large and diversified shareholder base is inherently bad.
Our results need to be seen in relation to the literature on neglected stocks: somewhat higher volatility could be a price well worth paying to avoid the detrimental value effects from "flying below the radar" of the broader investment community. Geographical is the number of geographical segments for which the firm reports sales. Diversification is the number of product segments for which the firm reports revenue. Earnings is net income divided by total assets. Booktomarket is book value of equity divided by market value of equity. Intangibles is the ratio of intangible assets to total assets. Sphere is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the firm belongs to one of the 20 main spheres in Sweden, zero otherwise. Weight is a coefficient indicating the weight the firm has in the portfolio of the largest shareholder, in relation to the weight it has in a broad index. Nrshlarge is the number of shareholders with an ownership stake exceeding 0.1%. Microfloat is the sum of ownership stakes below 0.1% as a percentage of the total number of shares. Nrshareholders is the total number of shareholders (in thousands Table IV , in these regressions we change the starting year to address the issue of survivorship bias. Model 1 has the year 2000 as starting year, whereas Models 2 and 3 have the years 2005 and 2010, respectively. As we shorten the time period the sample becomes less impacted by survivorship bias. All models contain period and industry fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parenthesis. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. For variable definitions, see Table I or section II.C. Table IV plus an interaction term between Nrinstdef and Microfloat. The shaded area is a 95% confidence interval calculated using the delta method. (Volatility) . We analyze the impact of the number of relatively large institutional owners (Nrinstlarge, Model 1) and the impact of a high portfolio concentration of the three largest owners (Instconc, Model 2). All models contain period and industry fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parenthesis. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. For variable definitions, see Table I 
